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# **Multi-Agent Systems Introduction**

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# **Motivations for agents**

- Five ongoing trends have marked the history of computing:
  - ubiquity;
  - interconnection;
  - intelligence;
  - delegation; and
  - human-orientation

# **Motivations for agents**

Delegation and Intelligence imply the need to build computer systems that can act effectively on our behalf

## This implies:

- The ability of computer systems to act independently
- The ability of computer systems to act in a way that *represents our best interests* while interacting with other humans or systems

# **Motivations for agents**

The emergence of a new field in Computer Science

Multiagent systems

# **Agent definition**

An agent is a computer system that is capable of *independent* action on behalf of its user or owner (figuring out what needs to be done to satisfy design objectives, rather than constantly being told) Agent = a hardware or (more usually) a softwarebased computer system that enjoys the following properties:

- autonomy agents operate without the direct intervention of humans or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state;
- reactivity: agents perceive their environment and respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it;
- pro-activeness: agents do not simply act in response to their environment, they are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking initiative.
- social ability agents interact with other agents (and possibly humans) via some kind of agentcommunication language;

# **Agent definition**

#### **Two main streams of definitions**

- Define an agent in isolation
- Define an agent in the context of a society of agents **social dimension MAS**

#### **Two types of definitions**

- Does not necessary incorporate intelligence
- Must incorporate a kind of IA behaviour → intelligent agents



# **Agents characteristics**

- act on behalf of a user
- be autonomous
- sense the environment and act upon it / reactivity
- purposeful action / pro-activity
- function continuously / persistent software
- mobility

#### Intelligence

- Goals, rationality
- Reasoning, decision making
- Learning/adaptation
- Interaction with other agents social dimension


# Example

- A key air-traffic control system...suddenly fails, leaving flights in the vicinity of the airport with no air-traffic control support. Fortunately, autonomous air-traffic control systems in nearby airports recognize the failure of their peer, and cooperate to track and deal with all affected flights.
- Systems taking the initiative when necessary
- Agents cooperating to solve problems beyond the capabilities of any individual agent



# **Another example**

- An agent searching the internet to achieve a goal for the user.
- The agent would typically be given a task that would require synthesizing pieces of information from various different Internet information sources.
- The agent can cooperate with other agents
- The agent must plan, arrange, buy, negotiate carry out arrangements of all sorts that would normally be done by its human user



# **Intelligent agents?**

### **Cognitive agents**

The model of human intelligence and human perspective of the world  $\rightarrow$  characterise an intelligent agent using symbolic representations and *mentalistic notions*:

- knowledge John knows humans are mortal
- beliefs John took his umbrella because he believed it was going to rain
- desires, goals John wants to possess a PhD
- intentions John intends to work hard in order to have a PhD



#### **Reactive agents**

- Simple processing units that perceive and react to changes in their environment.
- Do not have a symbolic representation of the world and do not use complex symbolic reasoning.
- Intelligence is not a property of the active entity but it is distributed in the system
- Steams as the result of the interaction between the many entities and the environment.







### The wise men problem

A king wishing to know which of his three wise men is the wisest, paints a white spot on each of their foreheads, tells them at least one spot is white, and asks each to determine the color of his spot. After a while the smartest announces that his spot is white


# The problem of pray and predators

# Image: Constraint of the second se

## **Cognitive agents**

- -detection of prey animals
- -predator agents have goals
- coordination is distributed
- -necessity for communication and for coordination

# The problem of pray and predators



#### **Reactive approach**

-The preys emit a signal whose intensity decreases in proportion to distance - plays the role of attractor for the predators

-Hunters emit a signal which acts as a weak repellent for other hunters, so as not to find themselves at the same place

-Each hunter is attracted by the pray and (weakly) repelled by the other hunters



#### **Prisoner's dilemma**


Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice.

A clever prosecutor makes the following offer to each. "You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, he will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for a heavy charge. If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomorrow morning."



# **Utility theory**

- A dominant approach to model the agent's interests is utility theory
- Utility theory = every state of the world has a degree of usefulness – utility or payoff, to an agent, and that agent will prefer states with higher utility
- Decision theory = an agent is rational if and only if it chooses the actions that yields the highest expected utility, averaged over all possible outcomes of actions



## Example

 To show how utility theory functions can be used as a basis for making decisions

		Bob	Carol
Club (c)	100	-90	1.5 factor
Movie (m)	50	-40	1.5 factor
Home (h)	50		
		<b>Movie (m)</b> 50	Club (c)100-90Movie (m)50-40

Bob prefers the Club 60% of time, 40% Movie Carol – 25% Club, 75% Movie



Which is Alice best course of action?

We list Alice's utilities for each possible state of the world

		Ν	Club (c) Aovie (m) Home (h)	<b>Bob</b> 100 50 50	<b>Ca</b> -90 -40	1.5 factor
A=c	B=c (60%)	B=m (40%)	A=m	B=c (60%)		B=m (40%)
C=c (25%)	15	150	C=c (25%)	50		10
C=m (75%)	10	100	C=m (75%)	75		15

 $U(A,c) = 0.25^{*}(0.6^{*}15+0.4^{*}150)+0.75^{*}(0.6^{*}10+0.4^{*}100) = 51.75$ 

 $U(A,m) = 0.25^{*}(0.6^{*}50+0.4^{*}75)+0.75^{*}(0.6^{*}75+0.4^{*}15) = 46.75$ 

U(A,h) = 50

## **Game theory**

- Agents have utility functions they want to maximize
- As long as the outcomes and their probabilities are known to the agent, it can decide how to act optimally
- Agents need to choose the course of action that maximize the expected utility
- But when there are 2 or more agents whose actions can affect each other's utility we turn to game theory

# **Definition of games in normal form**

- The normal form, also known as the strategic form, is the most familiar representation of strategic interactions in game theory.
- Represent every player's utility for every state of the world in the special case when states depend only on the player's combined actions
- Settings in which the states of the world depend also on the randomness of the environment are subject to Bayesian games – but they can be reduces to normal form games

## **Prisoner's dilema**

		Column	player
		Cooperate	Defect
Row	Cooperate	3, 3	0, 5
player	Defect	5, 0	1, 1

- Cooperate (not confessing)
- Defect (confessing)



# **TCP user's game**

- You and one of your colleagues are the only one using Internet
- Backoff mechanism of TCP
- You have 2 possible strategies: use Correct implementation or use a Defective implementation
- If both you and your colleague adopt C average packet delay is 1ms
- If you both adopt D then the delay is 3ms
- If one adopts D and the other C then no delay for the first and 4ms delay for the second

		Column	player
		Correct	Defect
Row	Correct	-1, -1	-4, 0
player	Defect	0, -4	-3, -3



Right

player

# Coordination gameColumn playerLeftRightRowLeft1, 10, 0

0, 0



A common payoff game is a game in which for all actions profiles and for any pair of agents *i*, *j* it is the case that u<sub>i</sub>(a)=u<sub>i</sub>(a)

1,

- They are also called pure coordination games or team games
- Agents have no conflicting interests, their aim is to coordinate on an action that is maximally beneficial to all





#### Matching pennies

V		
	Heads	Tails
Heads	<b>1</b> , -1	-1, 1
Tails	-1, 1	<b>1</b> , -1

- Properly called constant sum games
- A game is a constant sum game if there exists a constant c such that for each strategy profile a∈A<sub>1</sub> x A<sub>2</sub> it is the case that u<sub>1</sub>(a)+u<sub>2</sub>(a)=c
- If c=0 then zero-sum games
- Represent pure competition

# **Strategies in normal form games**

- Agents are supposed to behave rationally
- Rational behavior = an agent prefers a greater utility (payoff) over a smaller one
- Payoff maximization: what to maximize? From what point of view?





# **Strategies in normal form games**

Outside observer: can some outcomes be considered better than some others?

#### Social welfare

- The sum of agents' utilities (payoffs) in a given solution.
- Measures the global good of the agents
- Problem: how to compare utilities
- Pareto optimal solutions

From the individual agent's point of viewNash equilibrium

# **Pareto optimality**

A solution u, i.e., a utility vector u(a<sub>1</sub>), ..., u(a<sub>n</sub>), is Pareto efficient, i.e., Pareto optimal, if there is no other solution u' such that at least one agent is better off in u' than in u and no agent is worst off in u' than in u.

Measures global good, does not require utility comparison

#### Nash equilibrium

#### Definition

- Two strategies, S<sub>1</sub> of agent A and S<sub>2</sub> of agent B are in a Nash equilibrium if:
  - in case agent A follows S<sub>1</sub> agent B can not do better than using S<sub>2</sub> and
  - in case agent B follows S<sub>2</sub> agent A can not do better than using S<sub>1</sub>.

#### John Forbes Nash





#### Prisoners' Dilemma

		Column	player
		Cooperate	Defect
Row	Cooperate	3, 3	0, 5
player	Defect	5, 0	1, 1

Cooperate = not confessing Defect = confessing

#### Coordination game (Common payoff)

		Column	player
		Left	Right
Row	Left	1, 1	0, 0
player	Right	0, 0	1, 1



#### Matching Pennies (Zero-sum)

	Heads	Tails
Heads	<b>1</b> , -1	-1, 1
Tails	-1, 1	1, -1

#### BoS

	Football	Movie
Football	<mark>2</mark> , 1	<mark>0</mark> , 0
Movie	<mark>0</mark> , 0	<b>1</b> , 2



# Conclusions

- There is a wealth of research topics in MAS
- MAS combines artificial intelligence, distributed systems, machine learning and many other subjects and disciplines

#### AL-MAS Group

"AIM AS high as you can"



Computer Science & Engineering Department

